The size and composition of Tesla's board of directors has evolved to reflect the different stages of growth and changes in it investor base. Between 2004 and 2009, the company raised approximately $200 million through six funding events. Each time that the company sought capital, a lead investor was granted a seat on the board of directors. For example, in 2004, Elon Musk contributed $6.3 million out of a total $7.5 million Series A funding event. Concurrent with this investment, Musk assumed chairmanship of the board, where he served alongside co-founders Eberhard and Tarpenning. Following Series B, C, and D, the venture capitalists who provided financing were added to the board. In Series E, Daimler AG made a strategic investment in Tesla, for which it received a directorship. In 2009, to satisfy regulatory requirements prior to an impending IPO, the company added its first fully independent director-Brad Buss, chief financial officer of Cypress Semiconductor. The company also established formal board committees for audit, compensation, and nominating and governance. Prominent Silicon Valley lawyer Larry Sonsini was added as non-director outside counsel (see Exhibit 1).
Despite these changes, however, influence over the firm has remained largely with Musk. Musk not only participated in the company's first round of financing but maintained a significant ownership position by continuing to invest in subsequent rounds. Even after the company's IPO in 2010, which diluted private investors, Musk continued to hold 36 percent of Tesla's outstanding stock. Musk used his control to weigh in on strategic and technological decisions. He led the company's financing efforts, helping to determine who would participate and therefore the composition of the board itself. He successfully brought on his brother Kimbal Musk to serve as a director. Following internal disagreements, he was able to remove Eberhard as CEO and, after the brief appointment of two interim CEOs, assumed the position himself.
The company's board composition also reflects a transition from a fledgling organization to a formally managed public corporation. In the beginning, the company was focused almost entirely on survival. The three-person board comprising Musk, Eberhard, and Tarpenning in part reflects this. Subsequently, venture capitalists were brought on not only to provide financing but also to weigh in on strategy and operations. Board members Ehrenpreis, Gracias, and Jurvetson brought expertise in clean technology, material science, and financial operations. These skill sets enabled the company to verify its business model and add rigor to its internal processes. Later, as the company grew closer to full-scale production, it accepted a 10 percent strategic investment from Daimler AG. The addition of Herbert Kohler to the board, as a representative of Daimler and vice president of that company's Group Research and Advanced Engineering, reflected Tesla's need for further operational expertise as it ramped up production (see Exhibit 2).
What we might expect: As Tesla grows the composition of the board is likely to become more consistent with that of other publicly traded companies. After the venture capitalists that hold substantial equity positions sell down their investment, we would expect their representatives to step down from the board. They are likely to be replaced by more "conventional" public directors: active and retired CEOs, and other professionals with specific expertise in manufacturing, technology, financing, and law. As firms mature, different sets of skills are needed for the board of directors.
anTiTakeover ProTecTions and oTher resTricTive covenanTs
The company has adopted antitakeover protections that reflect its status as a relatively young technology company. At the time of Tesla's initial public offering, the company had several provisions in place to reduce the likelihood of a hostile takeover.
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These include a staggered board with three classes of directors, authorization to issue "blank check" preferred stock without shareholder approval, limitations on the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting, advance notice of shareholder proposals for business conducted at shareholder meetings, and power of the board to postpone or cancel previously scheduled shareholder meetings. Although such provisions might be viewed as indicative of management entrenchment, they might also serve a legitimate business purpose by granting Tesla time to commercialize its technology without the threat of early acquisition by a competitor.
Tesla has also agreed to restrictive covenants as part of its external financing agreements. For example, the company's financing agreement with Daimler grants that company favorable terms and conditions, including right of first refusal in case of a sale of Tesla and special contracts for production of parts. In addition, Musk has agreed not to transfer any of the shares beneficially owned by him to any other automobile manufacturer or to vote in favor of a proposed acquisition by an automobile manufacturer without Daimler's consent. A $465 million loan facility by the U.S. Department of Energy also contains restrictive covenants. The 2009 loan facility provides that Tesla will be in default if Musk and certain of his affiliates sell down their ownership position by 35 percent prior to one year after completion of the company's new Model S (which the loan facility serves to finance).
3 Together, these covenants further reduce the likelihood of an unsolicited change in control.
What we might expect: Telsa might make no changes to the antitakeover protections. Antitakeover provisions enable the board and management to extract the highest price possible from a potential suitor (i.e., they can stop a takeover if company officials view the price as too low). However, as Telsa becomes more widely owned, shareholders might pressure the board to unwind some or all of these restrictions. This is especially true if shareholders believe that the adoption of these protections is not in their best interest.
coMPensaTion
As might be expected with a new innovative company, executive compensation at Tesla is heavily skewed toward equity-based pay. In 2009, Musk was awarded $24.1 million in compensation, comprising $33,000 salary, $23.9 million in options, and $206,000 in other compensation and benefits. 4 This mix is not inconsistent with that awarded at other technology companies in Silicon Valley, particularly among companies whose shareholder base is dominated by a controlling CEO. Half of the stock option awards granted to Musk contain basic time-based vesting, with one quarter of those shares vesting immediately and the remainder vesting monthly. The other half of Musk's equity awards are performance-based stock options, with milestone vesting. One quarter of these shares vest upon successful completion of the engineering prototype for Model S; one quarter vest upon completion of the vehicle prototype for Model S; one quarter upon the first Model S production vehicle; and the final quarter upon completion of the ten thousandth Model S production vehicle. Milestone vesting is commonly used by companies whose future success is heavily reliant upon the successful introduction of new technology (see Exhibit 3).
What we might expect: As Telsa becomes a more mature company, it is likely to adopt executive compensation packages that are more conventional in structure. These might include a higher cash portion and lower equity portion. Tesla is also less likely to grant significant options with strategic milestone vesting once it has established commercial success. However, so long as Musk remains CEO, the mix of compensation might continue to skew heavily toward equity-linked rewards. That said, at some point, Musk and others will potentially desire to consume their personal wealth or diversify their investment portfolios. When this occurs, the company is likely to increase the cash portion of compensation, or allow Musk to engage in hedging or sales transactions.
Why This MaTTers
1. Many prominent experts in corporate governance advocate a set of best practices in terms of board structure, antitakeover protections, and compensation. However, the case of Tesla demonstrates that governance is often company specific, based on the organization's current stage of development and operating needs. How well is this understood by those who examine and critique governance practices at specific corporations-including proxy advisory firms, the financial press, and other experts? 2. At Tesla, we see a pronounced change in the board of directors from inception to IPO. These changes seem consistent with the skills required as the company developed operationally and financially. What changes should be made in the future as Tesla continues to evolve as a public company? How will the board change over time in terms of structure, composition, and skills set? We believe that Mr. al darmaki possesses specific attributes that qualify him to serve as a member of our Board of directors, including his experience with both international public and private companies and his experience in the energy sector. from stanford University. We believe that Mr. ehrenpreis possesses specific attributes that qualify him to serve as a member of our Board of directors and serve as chair of our corporate governance committee and chair of our compensation committee, including his experience in the cleantech and venture capital industries. We believe that Mr. Musk possesses specific attributes that qualify him to serve as a member of our Board of directors, including his experience with private technology companies and his business experience in retail and consumer markets.
